Riyadh also illustrates the gulf between the hype and the reality of terror. For the past 20 months, many in the media and elsewhere have focused much of their attention on so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These encompass chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices and vary in importance and impact according to what you read.

Yet, despite these fanciful and, some might say, speculative or anticipatory scenarios, the actuality of terrorism remains rather more mundane. Since 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have largely consisted of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and car bombs. Indeed, some commentators have already noted that detonating such devices in the Saudi capital is a bit like blowing up your own living room to get rid of an unwanted guest.

As the US State Department's own 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' statistical report for 2002 reveals, out of approximately 200 terrorist attacks that occured last year, fewer than 10 were perpetrated in North America or Western Europe. This is not to suggest that we can all relax; but rather, that in whatever discussion ensues on these matters we need to ensure an appropriate sense of perspective is maintained.

Al Qa'ida is not equivalent to the Red Army, against whom the Western powers maintained a stand-off for almost half a century under the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Yet, we seem to have turned this latest threat into a very potent one in our minds. The Soviet Union was known to have a vast nuclear arsenal and a significant chemical and biological weapons capability. Is it possible that our fears about Osama bin Laden and his acolytes tell us rather more about ourselves and our attitudes to unexpected risks than about the enemies that we now face?

In February 2003, a US Government advisory panel published its report, 'Towards a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism'. This covers some well-rehearsed ground amongst intelligence and security circles, suggesting that the best form of defence is offence. Yet, when it comes to the offensive, many of the terms used in this '4D strategy' (defeat, deny, diminish, defend) appear remarkably defensive in outlook.

Despite allusions to a 'war of ideas', the document seems remarkably bereft on this front. There is a tendency to merely assume things that ought to be more clearly spelt out. . Freedom and democracy get a look in, but their content remains unexplored. It has never ceased to amaze me, since I started examining these matters, how little there is by way of a positive promotion of what we stand for, what we expect those who are 'with us' to fight for, and where it is we think we are heading.

Surely, it is not too much to ask our leaders to spell this out more fully? After all, if we believed in and felt inspired by a common sense of mission, then not only would our societies be more resilient in the face of adversity, but there may be others, in less fortunate parts of the world, who may wish to buy-into those aspirations too. Rather than dictating democracy to them, maybe we should get our own house in order.

Defeating terrorism cannot be limited to better gadgetry either. Yet, alongside the calls for new protective equipment and better detection instruments, the desire for better intelligence or new structures of governance are also rather narrow and technical aims. If we are not careful, the vast sums of money being poured into the blue-light services and other emergency response operations may all go to feeding a new bureaucracy, rather than truly protecting ourselves.

It is vital therefore, that the public become involved in these debates and that they tell their leaders how they would wish to see things prioritised. Many argue there is little time for such niceties. We face a real enemy now, which has to be dealt with. There will, according to this view, be plenty of time later for more philosophical discussion as to the future of society or engaging the masses in such a discourse. I could not disagree more.

What we do today is informed by where we believe we are heading, and it will affect where we are tomorrow and the kind of debate we will then have. Monitoring our neighbours, or putting more cameras everywhere, may make us feel safer for a short while, but eventually this approach will serve only to further fragment the human bonds that bind us together as a society. Our technologies reflect our priorities, not vice-versa.

For instance, I have heard it said more than once that we need to understand why it is that a small number of Asian youth are attracted by fringe Islamist groups. This strikes me at best as a remarkable inversion of the real issue, at worst as a form of self-denial. In truth, we need to understand why Asian youth, and many others besides, are no longer attracted to our vision of the future. What is it about our societies, at the beginning of this new century, that leaves them so bereft of the ability to inspire, provide purpose, meaning and structure to people's lives, and thereby allow people to realise their ambitions?

Our failure, not their magnetism is key here. They are effectively pushed not pulled. To suggest otherwise is to deny the real balance of power and responsibility. And this problem of disillusion impacts well beyond the 'usual suspects'. I would suggest that even if we managed to rid ourselves of every last member of Al Qa'ida tomorrow, the problems we face will not go away. Our exaggerated sense of fear would still be with us. But, more significantly, by elevating our perceived vulnerabilities consistently for over a year now, we have effectively educated a new generation of terrorists, cranks, hoaxers and disaffected loners as to how to undermine our societies and our sense of well-being using such rudimentary tools as box-cutters and bags of sugar.

In closing, I point to a further conundrum this conference ought to address; that is, the culture of mistrust and cynicism at home. It is clear for instance, that even if a bucket of white powder or some other agent was to be discovered in Baghdad tomorrow, many of our domestic population would believe, despite the evidence, that the Americans had planted it there.

Maybe some of the greatest battles we will face in the war on terror are battles on the home front, or battles in our minds. Refusing to recognise this and continuing to prosecute a traditional campaign against enemies 'out there' may well be a failure to recognise what truly changed at the end of the Cold War. This could lead to a far longer and more destructive campaign than anyone yet anticipates.

'Communicating the War on Terror' was designed to address many of these issues and to engage the public first-hand in shaping this future. What should Governments tell the public about terror threats? What is the role of the media in the war on terror? These are just two hooks around which many deeper issues lie. I hope the debate continues long after the event. There has never been a more pressing time to examine our beliefs, our fears and our sense of purpose.

Bill Durodié is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London where he
co-ordinates the 'Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks' programme.

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