

The Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks: The Local Dimension

Final Report

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1. Background

This sub-project is part of a wider programme of work led by the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College, London, examining a number of issues in relation to the domestic management of terrorist attacks. This sub-project focuses upon local responses to terrorist incidents and addresses two key aspects of the wider programme's objectives:

- The balance between continuity and change in the nature of terrorist threats since 9/11, particularly by focusing upon the perceptions of local actors 'on the ground'.
- The policy challenges to integration and coherent response across different levels of government and, indeed, across agencies, again, as perceived by local actors.

Attention is focused especially upon local government as the primary focus for emergency planning (Local Government Act 1972) but also the other 'first responding' agencies that have specified responsibilities in the locality (i.e. police, fire, ambulance and related 'blue light' services). Consequently, the research provides a unique perspective on local responses to potential terrorist attack.

Policy context

The capacity of local agencies such as local authorities, police, fire and ambulance services to respond effectively to terrorist incidents has become a major policy issue, especially since the terrorist incidents of 11th September 2001 in the USA and 11th March 2004 in Spain. The local dimension is a significant aspect of the wider policy concern with civil contingencies and the development of effective responses to the threats of terrorism. At a policy level, a terrorist attack on the UK is now widely accepted to be an inevitability rather than just a possibility, despite formal denials from the Government. Speaking in March 2004, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir John Stevens argued that London, particularly, was a target for terrorism:

We do not know that we have actually stopped terrorist attacks happening in London but, as the **Prime Minister and Home Secretary have said**, there is an **inevitability** that some sort of attack will get through... (BBC News 2004a, emphasis added).

Although these claims have subsequently been rebuffed by Government ministers, there remains an official acceptance that the terrorist threat is 'serious, it is credible, it is real, it has increased since 9/11 and it is going to be with us for the long term' (Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears, cited in Daily Telegraph, 19 July 2004).

The accuracy of these claims is not the subject of the research reported here. Rather, the research accepts as its starting point, the policy belief in the likelihood of terrorist attacks and the consequent policy concern with effective local responses to the threat.

The policy commitment to this 'reality' is clear. A number of initiatives have been put in place since 2001, including:

- A new Civil Contingencies Bill is likely to receive Royal Assent in November 2004 – although this Bill and the its sponsoring department, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, were put in place several months before 9/11.
- New equipment has been financed in key services: most notably, the NHS has received £85m to train for bio-terrorism and the Fire Service has received £56m for decontamination equipment and training.
- The 2004 Spending Review committed a doubling of expenditure on local authority resilience activities to £40.5m for each year between 2005 and 2008 (Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2004).
- A pamphlet sent to every household in the UK, *Preparing for emergencies: what you need to know*, supposedly informs citizens of what they should do in the event of a variety of emergencies
- A number of high profile exercises and simulations have taken place to test responses to potential incidents and to learn lessons.

Despite these and other initiatives, however, there remain significant concerns that the UK is still not as prepared as it should be. Concerns vary from claims by the Royal Society that there have been insufficient attempts made to combat the threat of chemical or biological attack (BBC News, 2004b) through to the lack of adequate planning in local authorities (BBC News, 2004c). The policy context, therefore, is one of increasing concern with both the threat and the limitations of current responses.

Academic context

Despite the increasing policy focus on local responses to terrorist incidents and other civil contingencies, academic analysis, particularly within the social

sciences, has been surprisingly absent. Related issues are now being addressed, at least to some extent, by the ESRC's Future Security Challenges programme. However, the purpose of this research project has been to fill the gap between policy and academic discussion of this topic by both generating empirical evidence of the state of local emergency planning and to engage in analysis of the major issues that emerge from this evidence.

2. Objectives

Policy and media based research in this area has focused especially upon immediate responses to the issues raised by 9/11 and has taken as its starting point the assumption that the level and nature of the terrorist has greatly increased (cf. BBC Radio 4, 2002; LGA 2003). Attention has focused, therefore, especially upon the preparedness of particular agencies in relation to specific types of threat, the levels of resource being made available for category 1 responders and the roll out of particular equipment.

The objectives of this project, while not ignoring these important issues, have been focused much more upon the strategic and analytical changes that have taken place in recent years. While the change in the policy paradigm at national level is accepted, we do not assume that this change has been universally taken on-board by emergency planners across the country or that their responses to it are uniformly the same. This project looks beyond the immediate responses and seeks to understand the longer term changes and consequences that are a feature of the emerging civil contingencies environment.

The central research question was focused upon identifying 'best practice': what constitutes good emergency planning at the local level in the context of potential terrorist attacks and how might emergency planning at the local level be improved?

1. What is the current state of local emergency planning in the UK and what is its capacity to respond to a wide range of potential terrorist attacks?
2. What lessons have been learned from earlier 'shocks to the system', especially previous terrorist attacks, and how have they been incorporate into thinking in the post 9/11 era?
3. Has there been a paradigm shift in local policies towards the post 9/11 terrorist threats and what are the implications of such a shift, or absence of it, for the way in which policies/strategies are developed and articulated?
4. Does the wider context of local governance and the local government modernisation agenda complement, strengthen or militate against the successful development of local emergency responses to domestic terrorist attacks?

3. Methods

The research effort was focused around all category 1 responders. Evidence was collected through three main tools:

3.1 Policy review

A review of policy in relation to emergency planning and civil contingencies was undertaken early in the project. The main purpose of this review was to establish the nature of policy change since 9/11 in relation to local emergency planning and the extent to which there had been a significant shift in thinking in response to it. Responses that reflected other recent emergency planning events (flooding, foot and mouth disease and soon) were also taken into account in this review. This activity was primarily desk based but also included interviews with staff from the Emergency Planning College.

3.2 Survey of category 1 responders

A survey of all category 1 responders was undertaken by the research team in November and December of 2003. The survey was designed to perform two main functions: first, it addressed a number of the research questions (as set out above), providing a valuable dataset on the level of preparedness of different category 1 responders; second, it acted as a purposive sampling tool to select contrasting case studies within two regions (see below). Rather than duplicating the survey evidence produced by the Local Government Association (LGA, 2003), the instrument explored both factual and perceptual aspects of the following areas: organisation and locality details; plans and exercises; information flows; resources for emergency planning at local level; and general perceptions about emergency planning with particular reference to any changes since 9/11. A sample of the survey instrument is attached as appendix 1.

The survey instrument was sent to all emergency planning officers (EPOs) in England and Wales,¹ as well as regional ambulance and county fire and police services, in November 2003. Follow-up letters were sent in January 2004. A final response rate of 58 per cent was achieved. This response rate is exceptionally high for this type of survey and offers, therefore, a rich source of evidence with which to

¹ Scotland was not included because emergency planning procedures differ from England and Wales and, at the time of selection the Civil Contingencies Bill did not apply to Scotland. Northern Ireland was not included because the different political and administrative context of the province may have skewed the findings from the survey.

analyse the current state of emergency planning. It should be noted that, in addition, some county EPOs responded on behalf of district EPOs – the real response rate, therefore, is higher than 58 per cent.

3.3 Case studies

In order to explore the research questions in more detail, case studies in selected areas were undertaken, in the form of interviews with emergency planning officers and others involved in civil contingencies in the selected areas. Two regions were identified:

London: as the capital city, with high commuter, tourist and urban populations major transport links including rail, road and air, and being home to Parliament, government offices and embassies and previous experience of terrorism, was of particular interest. The following areas were selected on the basis that they have either experienced terrorism or have significant potential targets:

- Kensington and Chelsea
- Barking and Dagenham
- Tower Hamlets
- Richmond
- Ealing
- City of London
- Hounslow

The North West of England provides a contrast to the London experience. It has a range of areas with regard to population and concentration of transport links and industry. Some areas have experience of terrorism and it is home to number of chemical and nuclear plants. Case studies were focused on areas that have experienced terrorist incidents (Manchester, Warrington) and areas that have significant potential targets (Cumbria – Sellafield; Cheshire – chemical plants):

- Cheshire
- Warrington
- Manchester
- Cumbria
- Copeland

In total, 24 interviews were undertaken. The full list of interviews is included as appendix 2.

The analytical approach to this data has been to synthesise qualitative and quantitative findings around core themes that have emerged from the data.

4 Findings and analysis

Policy discussion in relation to the local management of terrorist attacks provides a confused picture. On the one hand, a range of central government sources tend to emphasise how much is being done to address perceived shortcomings in capacity and resources. On the other hand, specialised commentators, from senior police officers through to emergency planning officers, tend to stress the shortfall in financial and technical resources and the limitations of what can be achieved in any specific response. This analysis seeks to move beyond this dichotomous policy debate, to develop a more sophisticated picture of emergency planning and civil contingencies in England and Wales. Four rhetorical themes emerge, each of which are partly true but warrant further analysis.


To some extent, there is substance to the claims of this rhetoric: in part to allay public concern and to deter would-be threats to the system and, in part, to drive policy change and development (cf. Parsons, 1995; John, 1998; *inter alia*). However, the claims of this rhetoric are often simplistic and obscure important differences and limitations in the emergency planning structure. In setting out the themes, therefore, it is important to both surface the implicit assumptions of these claims and to critically analyse their validity in different contexts.

a) *Prepared, resourced and ready*

The extent to which localities are prepared, resourced and ready to face a range of potential emergencies is, of course, a central policy issue. Emergency planning in the UK has a long history, dating back at least as far as the Emergency Powers Act 1920. Its development as a policy area has been subject to a number of events, ranging from the civil defence issues arising during the second world war through to the different threats posed by the subsequent cold war and the more recent bombing campaigns of the IRA. Civil contingencies, therefore, are well embedded in the organisational and institutional structures of local governance. The rhetoric around this issue, therefore, tends to emphasise that local government and other first responding agencies are well prepared and ready to respond to a range of incidents. It suggests that localities are generally good at emergency planning.

The evidence from the survey confirms much of this argument. There are robust plans in place that address a broad range of contingencies. Some 88 per cent of respondents had updated their emergency plans within the last 12 months. A variety of exercises take place regularly that test the different aspects of the emergency plans and which ensure that co-ordination across agencies is well-rehearsed: over 90 per cent had undertaken some form of emergency exercise during the same period. Indeed, 53 per cent claimed to have been involved in some form of 'live' or 'command post' exercise in the preceding 12 months and not simply desk based exercises. The first responding agencies were actively involved in

most of these exercises (see chart 1) and there were good levels of coordination between them: 85 per cent meet at least once every six months at the operational level and 63 per cent every three months. This level of planning, testing and coordinating emergency plans suggests a general conclusion that the UK is prepared for most eventualities and will respond adequately to any emergency.



It is in the detail that the level of preparation and the adequacy of resources become more questionable. First and most obviously, there are variations in the level of preparedness. While the majority of respondents had updated their emergency plans in the last year, 12 per cent had not. Even among those who considered themselves to be good at emergency planning doubts were expressed about how well prepared localities were to deal with the full range of threats. As one senior emergency planner that had experienced several IRA attacks in the past explained:

We could deal with a bomb – we’ve had plenty of practice – but not a CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear attack). There isn’t a local authority in the country that’s capable of dealing properly with a CBRN – and if they claim they can then they’re being over-confident or complacent (case study interview).

Smaller district authorities, in particular, feel under-prepared, as their comments on the survey instrument showed:

District councils are still being kept in the dark (survey number 199).


As a District authority we do not have the resources to address planning for terrorist incidents (survey number 219).

We are being asked on a regular basis if we are prepared and the answer is no (survey number 156).

...in relation to smallpox there continues to be considerable doubt and confusion as to what as a district council we would be expected to do in supporting the activities of others (survey number 117).

While these comments are unsurprising, especially as rural districts are often low risk areas for terrorist attacks, they are nonetheless significant. The effects of CBRNs, in particular, may well cross borders from densely populated areas to rural districts. Moreover, even in areas where there is a high risk target, district councils often feel uninvolved in the emergency planning process. Interviews with the emergency planning officers in an area with a nuclear power station revealed that while the county council had plans in place in the event of a major incident, the district council felt uninvolved in these plans and generally unprepared.

Second, even though the majority of first responding agencies have regularly updated emergency plans, the content of these plans varies considerably. Chart 2 lists a selected range of different aspects that plans contain. The most striking feature of this chart is that less than 50 per cent of plans cover procedures for nuclear, radiological or biological attacks. Indeed, even the more traditional form of bombing is covered by only a small majority of authorities. Furthermore, only 54 per cent of plans contain a full list of contacts and representatives. While the likelihood and level of risk will inevitably vary across areas – localities with chemical industries are more likely to plan for deliberate or accidental release of chemical materials than those a long way from such industries – there is, nevertheless, a significant variation observable from the survey, which undermines the assertion that all areas are prepared.



Third, there is a sense that the local authority aspect of emergency planning is greatly under-funded in relation to the other first responding organisations. Not surprisingly, 82 per cent of survey respondents felt that there were gaps with regard to funding when preparing for terrorist incidents. However, 70 per cent of respondents spend less than £100,000 per year on emergency planning and only 27% have a financial contingency to deal with the effects of an emergency. Statements from various respondents highlighted this sense of inequity:

Lots of money for emergency services and none for other Category 1 responders.

Considerable funding has been made available to the emergency services. However, no funding (additional) has been made available to local authorities, although there is increased expectation on our role (survey number 64)

Local authorities continue to be overlooked...and without the provision of a proper system of funding and dedicated resources we cannot realistically respond to government's and society's expectations of us on these matters (survey number 117)

Concerns with a lack of resources are not simply financial but also translate into broader concerns with an absence of equipment and training. Only 10 per cent of respondents felt that their organisation had the necessary equipment to respond to a terrorist incident and only 17 per cent felt that their staff were adequately trained to use the relevant equipment.

This third issue reflects, perhaps, the wider focus of emergency planning and the form of response that is expected from various organisations. Resources and, indeed, broader policy attention, have been focused on preventing attacks and, in the context of emergency planning, responding to and dealing with the immediate consequences of an attack, should terrorists be successful. This 'hard' responsive role – 'saving lives and shifting rubble', as one interviewee put it – is an important one that warrants significant resources. However, local authorities are often only peripherally involved in the immediate response, plugging the gaps where the 'blue light' services are not working. While there are important roles for local authorities to play at this point in the process (establishing rest centres, transporting victims away from the scene etc), their role becomes more important as the immediate crisis dissipates. Everything from re-housing victims to redeveloping infrastructure and business continuity falls into the remit of local government. It is these 'soft' responses that are largely overlooked in much of the contemporary policy discussion and which are poorly planned for and under-resourced.

The main conclusion from this rhetorical claim, therefore, is that while localities may appear generally to be prepared, resourced and ready to face a range of terrorist threats, beneath the surface there is considerable variation and uncertainty.

b) *Clarity of command and control*

This second rhetorical claim focuses upon the extent to which leadership and chain of command is understood in the context of specific emergencies. In principle, authority and responsibility is clearly set out in emergency plans and, indeed, is widely understood. There is a shared vision across agencies about how different types of incidents should be addressed and who will take the lead in different areas. Roles are clearly separated and understood and every agency is satisfied that their responsibilities and roles are commensurate with their ability to respond. Agencies are also satisfied that their roles in a particular incident reflect the wider role that their agency fulfils.

Evidence from the survey generally supports this rhetoric, particularly in relation to the immediate 'hard' responses. The survey evidence shows that 90 per cent of plans specify the role of different agencies in responding to different forms of emergency. The case studies also generally support this attitude: numerous examples were offered that demonstrated how leadership was put in place within an hour of an incident and chains of command quickly established. For example, Manchester has already zoned the city and provided maps of these zones to all category 1 and category 2 responders. In the event of any incident, messages and commands can easily be transferred across agencies by reference to these zones without risk of confusion about precisely where they refer to. Regular exercises help to reaffirm and build these structures of command and control. In the event of a terrorist attack, it can be expected that effective operational leadership will be established quickly.

Despite the generally strong and clear pattern of operational leadership that is displayed in most plans, exercises and, indeed, real life incidents, two concerns emerge from the empirical studies that call into question the wider patterns of leadership that might be expected to be important in such circumstances. First, there is an issue around the legitimacy of local politicians and the need for community leadership during periods of local crisis. Much of the local government modernisation agenda has been concerned with strengthening the legitimacy and authority of local political leadership and the development of council led partnerships (cf. DETR, 1998; Pratchett, 2000; Stewart, 2003; Stoker, 2004; *inter alia*). In short, since the Local Government Act 2000 and subsequent reforms, local political leaders should have a greatly strengthened sense of legitimacy and a wide set of institutions to enable them to act on behalf of their communities. While civil contingencies were never explicitly part of this modernisation process, it seems appropriate that at times of local crisis such political leadership should step to the fore. Indeed, the activities of Mayor Giuliani in New York in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks are a classic example of how local politicians can speak on behalf of their communities, provide the top-down will to ensure that everything is done that can be done, and to offer the wider leadership that may be lacking at the strategic level. In contrast, local government in the UK seems incapable of achieving this form of leadership. Speaking shortly

after the 9/11 attacks, the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, observed that should a similar event occur in the capital he would lack the powers or legitimacy to be able to adopt the same role. There remains a significant gap in strategic political and community leadership in response to terrorist attacks.

The activities and attitudes of emergency planners reflect and reinforce the disengagement of political leadership from the immediate response to terrorist attacks or other emergencies. Only 14 per cent of survey respondents felt that consultation with council members or a governing board was important in preparing emergency plans, compared with 57 per cent who felt that chief officers were important. Moreover, in the case study interviews a general sense that politicians should be kept well away from operational matters emerged. Most accepted that local politicians might be asked to speak to the press in some instances but felt that a senior police officer or other spokesperson would be better placed to give information to the media. In some respects, the lack of involvement of senior politicians reflects the lack of engagement among many local government senior officers who provide the main channel through which politicians might be brought into the process. Interviews with the Emergency Planning College revealed a sense of frustration that chief executives too often sidelined emergency planning and failed to attend the courses that would lead to effective strategic leadership. Given that chief officers generally overlook emergency planning, it is not surprising that local politicians are also left out of the process.

A further explanation for the ineffectiveness of local politicians in the event of a terrorist incident lies in the top-down approach that has conventionally surrounded such events and which is being reinforced in the Civil Contingencies Bill. The propensity of central government to take charge in the event of a significant incident, the creation of regional resilience forums and the appointment of regional leaders, all undermines the capacity and legitimacy of local elected politicians in such circumstances. The likelihood that citizens will look to central government to explain and address incidents only adds to this problem.

Linked to the absence of political leadership in the event of local terrorist incidents is a second concern around the contrasting cultures that exist in local government and the other first responding agencies. This problem is best explained by reference to an example given by an EPO from one of the case studies. In the event of a chemical, biological or radiological attack much of the initial response will be dealt with by the ambulance service and local NHS Trusts, with possibly the fire service supporting in a decontamination role. However, the local authority's role will be vital in providing emergency rest centres, transporting citizens and dealing with lower risk or low priority casualties in the first instance. This response might require the cooperation of a range of local government staff, from social workers or housing staff through to caretakers and catering support staff. Depending upon the scale of the incident and its location, a range of other staff may be called on to help out, from teachers through to leisure

services staff. Unlike in the 'blue light' services, however, much of the involvement of these staff will be voluntary and most will be working outside of their normal working patterns and expectations: dealing with such crises is not part of the 'day job' for most local government staff. They are unlikely to have easy access to knowledge that will explain the medical implications of the problems they are addressing and the risks that they are being exposed to. Faced with competing concerns about helping the public but also being exposed to potentially fatal risks, many may choose not to be part of the response or to interpret 'commands' from the centre in ways which they perceive minimises the risk to themselves. Most importantly, the discretionary and interpretive nature of the work undertaken by many of these professions differs greatly from the quasi-military command and control structures of the blue light services. Their responses to any incident, therefore, are likely to be more questioning of instructions and resistant to commands that are not clearly explained and justified. Unlike the blue light services, therefore, where the form of response to most incidents is both predictable and dependable, the types of response expected from local government staff is both unpredictable and uncertain. In many respects this concern relates back to the problem of 'soft' responses highlighted above. However, it also raises a critical concern about the dependability or otherwise of local government staff in the event of significant terrorist attack.

Finally, a third concern arises from the relationship between formal and informal patterns of communication. The quasi-military structures of emergency plans and the command and control mode of operation that is assumed in the event of an incident place considerable emphasis upon a formal structure of messaging and communication. In many respects, this structure and mode of operation is seen as an essential component of a successful and efficient response to any crisis. If messages are not be lost, confused or misinterpreted, it is vital that they go through a proper chain of communication, and are logged and recorded, before onward transmission. This process not only ensures accurate messaging but also allows for clarification and supervision of messages, which in turn avoids duplication of effort or, worse still, a failure of all parties to address a known problem during an incident. The problem with formal messaging systems is that the slow communication down at the very moment when time is of the essence. As one EPO who had experienced a major terrorist incident pointed out:

Messaging systems are garbage in big incidents. The system can get in the way so you have to break it down or find a way to get around it. The problem is that personal relationships help but they can also cock things up big time (case study interview).

The problem is essentially one of inter-agency trust and understanding, coupled with a need to retain a formal structure of command and control. Exercises and meetings enable staff across agencies to build relationships based on mutual respect or trust. These relationships may manifest themselves in a variety of ways, from implicit understanding of how different people will perform their roles through to the practical exchange of personal mobile phone numbers or other contact details. Faced with a

blockage in the system, individuals may well resort to informal modes of communication to get around the problem.

The evidence from the case studies suggests that effective responses to emergencies occur where relationships have been built across agencies at the operational level, where trust and respect have been developed and where informal patterns of communication and working are facilitated by these relationships. The problem, as identified by the quote above, is that the adoption of informal contacts may well undermine the formal command and control structure, thereby threatening the effectiveness of the response.

c) *Information and comprehension*

The third rhetorical claim focuses upon the belief that all those involved in preparing to respond to terrorist incidents have appropriate levels of information to support their planning and the capacity to interpret and understand the relevance and implications of different items of information. Because the UK has been involved in emergency planning for decades and has faced many terrorist activities in the past, there is an argument that the information processes around emergency planning are well established. Two aspects combine to make this argument compelling. First, there is the assertion that the nature of the threat is largely unimportant because the response varies little, regardless of the cause of the incident. A bomb blast is little different from an accidental gas explosion in terms of the immediate response required from the emergency services. As one interviewee put it 'really there is little or no difference – except for some elements of policing' (case study interview). Second, there is the assertion that because emergency planning has existed for a long time, emergency planning officers and others responsible for these activities are well networked and have established appropriate measures for ensuring that they are well-informed and up to date.

Several aspects of the information flows highlight dissatisfaction among many EPOs. First, many were critical of the fact that local authority staff do not have security clearance, unlike their Police equivalents, thereby restricting the information they have access to. This restriction was recognised by one Police respondent to the survey who agreed that 'expertise is restricted to small groups' (survey number 310). As an EPO in one of the case studies argued, knowledge under these circumstances is restricted to informal contacts and the establishment of trust to ensure that important information is passed on when necessary:

I've spent a long time working with the police and others to establish trust so that they'll tell us stuff that we wouldn't normally get to hear. You hear a lot through the grapevine. If we had security clearance this would make our jobs much easier.

Whether such security clearance would make any difference to the ability of local authorities to respond to terrorist incidents is arguable. However, there can be little doubt that EPOs feel aggrieved by their exclusion from the inner security circle, especially when they will be responsible for addressing many of the problems that may result from it.

Second, EPOs and other responding agencies were openly critical of the London-centric focus of much of the advice and information that central departments issue:

London is perceived to be the only place at risk. London is perceived to be the only place with expertise. What's good for London is good for the rest of the country! Only, if they were to come here they might learn what it is really about and how it really works (case study interview).

As this interviewee pointed out, the capital was not the only place targeted by the IRA and there have been numerous security concerns outside of London since 9/11. This critique acted as a barrier to sharing information and good practice, with central government being perceived as unwilling to listen to 'lessons from the provinces'. Moreover, this attitude also limited the effectiveness of information coming from central bodies. One survey respondent emphasised this point in relation to Home Office guidance:

Home Office CBRN guidance is seriously flawed and demonstrates a lack of consultation at operational level (survey number 170).


Third, and relating to this second point, information from central and other sources has only limited impact. Information for local emergency planning is offered from a range of central sources. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), the Cabinet Office (in which CCS is based), the Home Office and the Health Protection Agency (HPA), among others, all offer guidance and information on different threats and responses. The challenge for those receiving this information, therefore, is to process and prioritise potentially conflicting advice in a local context. In particular, the risk of missing important information among a potentially vast amount of communication needs to be guarded against. As one London based interviewee stated:

9/11 generated a vast amount of questions and subsequent paperwork. In this respect – and with regard to the volume of information which must be looked at within a time-frame – it can be easy to miss information (case study interview).

When asked whether information they received should be more streamlined, nearly half of the survey respondents agreed that it should be.

The survey asked respondents about the information they receive from various bodies, its usefulness and whether there was too much or too little of it. Chart 3 summarises the findings and highlights some important concerns. Most notably, there is a distinction between information that comes top-down to localities and that which is provided locally. Less than half of respondents find information from central government departments

or agencies 'useful', despite the weight of this information, although between 30 and 40 per cent of respondents consider information from these sources to be insufficient. Information from partner organisations is deemed overwhelmingly more useful than information from any other source. It is noticeable, however, that local businesses and communities rarely offer useful information for emergency planning, although many respondents think that they should glean more information from these sources. Finally, there is an anomaly around the information that is received from European or international bodies. Very few organisations (less than 7 per cent) find information from these sources useful and yet 44 per cent consider information from these sources insufficient. This evidence suggests that many EPOs feel there is a gap in the information coming through in relation to the so-called 'war on terror'.




Fourth, despite the wealth of information and the limited value which may respondents place upon it, a significant proportion feel that there is a need for more information. Some 58 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that, in planning to respond to a terrorist incident, there are gaps with regard to communication with central departments, while 61 per cent felt there were gaps in the provision of information.

Overall, therefore, the picture of information flows is one in which there is a substantial volume being made available, much of which is useful but others of which are largely ignored. However, what is not clear from this analysis is the ability of individual planning officers to comprehend and interpret this information in the local context. Given that the information may vary from general warnings through to complex technical data, the capacity for individuals to be able to make sense of all of this information must be limited. This observation is perhaps best reflected by the finding

that individuals are mostly dependent upon information from partner organisations. It is perhaps in the comfort of trusted relationships and shared problems that planners feel safest in reaching judgements about the value and relevance of the information they receive.

d) *Change and continuity*

This final rhetorical claim is concerned with the extent to which the world of emergency planning has really changed since 9/11. Clearly, a number of events have made civil contingencies a significant policy issue in recent years, not only in relation to the threat of terrorism but also in relation to natural disasters such as flooding, foot and mouth disease and so on. The implementation of plans as a result of such incidents and the increased policy attention given to emergency planning in the light of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings could, arguably, significantly change the thinking and behaviour of local actors. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify a degree of continuity in the behaviour of local actors who emphasise the limited effect that such incidents have had upon their localities and point to incremental or evolutionary changes in emergency planning rather than a step change in responses.



The argument that there has been a significant change in thinking since 9/11 – perhaps even a paradigmatic shift in understanding and attention – is borne out by responses to the survey. When asked whether threat perceptions had changed since 9/11, 72 per cent answered with an unequivocal ‘yes’ and a further 23 per cent acknowledged ‘to some extent’. Only 5 per cent of respondents rejected such a change altogether.

Furthermore, when asked what types of incidents they should plan for, respondents identified a rich range of potential risks to their own areas. Chart 4 summarises the responses. In short, bombings, CBRNs and attacks on utilities or transport infrastructure are all considered high risks in many areas. Even more unusual forms of terrorism (at least in the UK), such as suicide bombing feature significantly in many local concerns. The extent to which attitudes have changed was apparent in many of the case studies and in the written responses included with the survey instrument:

The scale of the incident which it is now believed may occur is significantly greater than it was pre-9/11. The probability of an attack has also increased (Police respondent).


Although the risk is probable low, we must be (and we are not in a number of ways) ready to respond to all threats (EPO).

There is said to be greater awareness of irrational terrorism, the need for cross-border co-operation and co-ordination, mutual aid and national support (EPO).

There has been an increase in awareness post 9/11(Police respondent).

It took events of 9/11 to make us wake up and start again doing a job properly as we had during the Cold War. The so called peace dividend has shown us to be quite unprepared – again! (Fire service respondent).

Many people working in the area of emergency planning and civil contingencies buy into the argument that the world has changed and that their responsibilities have, therefore, changed significantly as well.



At the same time, however, there is also a strong sense of continuity in the responses offered by many – even among those who claim to recognise a paradigmatic shift in thinking. Behaviour has not altered radically in many areas. The number of exercises may have increased and there is widespread awareness of different threats but this awareness has not necessarily been translated into action. Chart 5 plots the distinction between the number of organisations recognising a risk to their area from bombing, biological or chemical attack and the number including such risks within their plans. Somewhat surprisingly, significantly fewer organisations include such risks in their plans than recognise them as being potential threats to their areas. In terms of action, therefore, 9/11 does not appear to have radically altered the threat perceptions of many emergency planners. This finding is backed up by the observation that among responding organisations, only 11 per cent had subjected their plans to ‘major changes’ or a ‘radical overhaul’.

The emphasis on continuity also featured in the case studies. While respondents responded to the rhetoric of widespread change, many also recognised the limited reality of such change:

At a local level, Category 1 responders now work very closely together. At national / governmental level attitudes changed after 9/11 but things now seem to have ‘gone off the boil’. Interest and funding simply isn’t there (EPO).

After the initial shock of 9/11, for many emergency planning officers civil contingencies have returned to business as normal. The only real change is that they are now operating in a climate that affords them greater legitimacy and an increased resource base (all be it limited in some instances).

5 Conclusions

In exploring the nature of local emergency planning this analysis has focused particularly upon getting beneath the surface of the rhetorical claims that populate the policy statements and beliefs. Consequently, eight main findings follow from this analysis:

- i) There is no clear or coherent understanding of the terrorist threat facing localities and an absence of agreement over its significance and implications. Consequently, plans and concerns are inconsistent and claims to resources remain confused.
- ii) The relationship between uncertainty and continuity in emergency planning remains ill-defined and underdeveloped. On the one hand, there is widespread recognition of a step change in thinking since 9/11. On the other, however, behaviour in many localities has not altered.

- iii) Attention is overly focused on the immediate 'hard' responses to incidents and insufficient attention is directed towards the 'soft' responses that may be more intractable and have significant long term consequences. This attention gap is possibly one of the most significant failings in contemporary emergency planning and the one that needs the most policy attention.
- iv) There is a need to ensure that plans and exercises build upon the informal relationships and working patterns as well as the formal structures – this is important to ensure trust, cooperation and coordination in the event of an incident. At the same time, however, more attention needs to be given to the way in which informal relationships already work and the implications of these for the formal practices on which plans are currently based.
- v) Plans and exercises are only useful if they deliver an instinctive response from individuals – plans often do not get read in the first few days of a major incident. Consequently, frequent but varying exercises that involve a range of partners are necessary not only to test responses but also to continue to build and reaffirm responses.
- vi) The relationship between responsibility, accountability and leadership in the event of an incident remains confused and blurred. Communities may need effective political leadership as well as short term operational leadership. These issues remain ignored in most areas and are not given attention by the Civil Contingencies Bill.
- vii) Localities are generally well networked and coordinated – the main gaps appear to be between localities and the regional/central level. In particular, a London-centric and top-down focus on information provision has served to alienate many localities and restrict the opportunity for learning and lesson building.
- viii) More attention needs to be given to the way lessons are learned and transferred across areas. At present the lessons from past shocks to the system have not been absorbed into the mindset and operational practices of most areas.

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Appendix 1 – Survey instrument

Attached as separate document

Appendix 2 – List of interviews

Confidential

**Local Governance Research Unit
Leicester Business School
De Montfort University**

Research into the Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks
First Responders: Prepared, Resourced and Ready?

Preliminary Questionnaire

Introductory comments

This questionnaire is being circulated to all category 1 agencies in England and Wales to establish a national picture of how prepared, resourced and ready these agencies are to respond to a terrorist attack in their areas. This information is important not only for our own research programme but also at a wider policy level. It is only by developing a comprehensive picture of the current position that we can identify gaps and make recommendations to the Government and other organisations on how to address them. We hope that you will be able to find the time to complete it.

The information that you provide will be treated in strictest confidence. While we ask some questions about your locality, your organisation and your position within it, these are simply for analytical purposes. We will not share individual responses with any other individual or organisation outside of the research team. Only aggregated and analysed information will be made available publicly.

The aggregated results of this questionnaire and other aspects of our research will be made available on our web-site as they become available.

www.dmu.ac.uk/lgru

If you have any questions relating to the completion of this questionnaire, or want more information on the research programme, please contact:

*Ms Caroline Laird
Department of Public Policy
De Montfort University
The Gateway
Leicester LE1 9BH*

claird@dmu.ac.uk

Telephone: 0116 2577780

Please **return** the completed questionnaire by **FRIDAY 19TH DECEMBER** to:

*Ms Alison Dale
C/o Ms Caroline Laird
Department of Public Policy
De Montfort University
The Gateway
Leicester LE1 9BH*

A reply paid envelope is enclosed for this purpose

Completing the questionnaire

We anticipate that the questionnaire should take you about 20 minutes to complete. Some of the questions ask you for straight forward facts. Others are seeking your opinions. We also offer some space for additional comments. While we do not expect all respondents to offer additional comments, we will be grateful for any supplementary points you wish to make.

Sequence no:

Section 1 Your Organisation and its locality

This section asks questions about your organisation and your role within it. We are requesting personal information, as one of the aims of our research is to create a profile of the types of people working in the field of emergency planning. The information will be used to analyse differences between types of organisation and the roles and backgrounds of officers working in them. We would also be grateful for further contact information (email and telephone) in case we need to follow up any responses.

1.1 Contact details – *Please provide us with your contact details or attach a business card*

Name:

Job title:

Address:

Email:

Telephone:

1.2 Personal details – *please provide the following information:*

Age at last birthday:

<20

20-29

30-49

50 or over

Gender: M

F

Educational background – Which of the following do you have (*please tick all that apply*)

GCSE

A level/GNVQ

First degree

Masters

PhD

Professional qualification (please give details)

1.3 Your background

i) How long have you held this specific position?

<1yr

1-4

5-9

10 or more

ii) How long have you worked in emergency planning?

<1yr

1-4

5-9

10 or more

iii) How long have you worked in this organisation?

<1yr

1-4

5-9

10 or more

iv) Have you worked for another organisation in an emergency planning role?

Yes

No

v) Have you worked in another job before taking up a career in emergency planning? If No, go to question 1.4. If Yes, please tick all which apply:

Another job within this organisation

Military

Police

Other public sector

Private sector

Other (please specify)

- 1.4 Is your area a high risk area
medium risk area
low risk area

(Please note we are not referring to the classifications given to the whole of the UK in light of security threats. Rather, we want to know if your area is specifically defined as high, medium or low risk due to any territory that may be seen to be particularly vulnerable to attack i.e. airport / chemical plants etc.)

Comments:

Section 2: Emergency plans and exercises

This section asks questions about the current status of your own organisation's emergency plans and its links to those of other organisations. It also asks about any emergency exercises that your organisation has been involved in over the last year. The information provided will be used to develop a comprehensive picture of plans and exercises across the country. While we are aware of statutory regulations, we also recognise that some local authorities operate within their own timetable with regard to holding exercises.

2.1 How recently was your organisation's emergency plan reviewed / updated?

- In the last 3 months
- Between 4 and 6 months ago
- Between 7 and 9 months ago
- Between 10 and 12 months ago
- More than 12 months ago

2.2 In your opinion, how significant were the changes made to your emergency plan when it was last reviewed / updated?

- No changes
- Minor changes
- Some significant changes
- Major changes
- Radical overhaul

Additional comments: _____

2.3 Which of the following does your plan cover? (please tick all which apply)

- Deliberate release of nuclear material
- Accidental release of nuclear material
- Deliberate release of chemical material
- Accidental release of chemical material
- Deliberate release of toxic (biological) material
- Accidental release of toxic (biological) material
- Explosion
- Threat assessment
- Decontamination procedures

- Procedure for victims presenting themselves at hospitals
- Procedure for supposed victims presenting themselves at hospitals
- Procedure for victims presenting themselves at other healthcare facilities
- Procedure for supposed victims presenting themselves at other healthcare facilities
- List of representatives
- Specific roles of emergency services & Local Authority
- Other (please specify)

2.4 In preparing your latest plans, how important were consultations with the following?

	Important	Some importance	None
Chief officers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Council members /governing board	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other first responding organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Second responder organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General public	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify) _____			

2.5 What other emergency plans do you have copies of?

- Other first responders
- Neighbouring organisation that you share a boundary with

2.6 How many of each of the following types of emergency planning exercises has your organisation undertaken since 1st January 2003?

	None	1-4	5-8	9-12	>12
Table top/ workshop/seminar	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Command Post	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Live	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2.7 Who was involved in these exercises? *(please tick all that apply)*

Category 1 Responders:

- Fire
- Police
- NHS bodies (including Ambulance)
- Local Authorities
- Environment Agency
- Maritime & Coastguard Agency

Category 2 Responders:

- Utility companies
(water, gas, electricity and/or telecommunications)
- Companies in the transport sector
(railways, airport and/or maritime)
- Health & Safety Executive

Other *(please list)*

Others not listed under Category 1 or 2 *(please specify)*

2.8 Who designed these exercises? *(please tick all that apply)*

- Your organisation
- Other first responder
- External organisation
- Derived from central plans

2.9 In your opinion, how well did these exercises run?

- No problems
- A few minor problems
- Some significant problems
- Substantial problems
- Failure

2.10 In your opinion, how successful were these exercises in enhancing team building/co-operation structures?

- Excellent
- Very good
- No change
- Poor
- Failed

2.11 In your opinion, how effective were these exercises in providing learning opportunities for the participants?

- Excellent
- Very good
- No change
- Poor
- Failed

2.12 In your opinion, how useful was feedback from the following people after the exercises had taken place?

	Useful	Of some use	None
Civil Contingencies Secretariat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Home Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cabinet Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ODPM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Health protection Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partner organisations in locality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Professional risk assessment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Second responder organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General public	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify) _____

Please make any additional comments on emergency planning exercises:

2.13 Have you had reason to implement your emergency plans in relation to any of the following incidents – potential or actual - in the last five years? (*please tick all that apply*)

- Flooding
- Foot & Mouth
- Major transport incidents
- Bombs
- Biological incident
- Chemical incident
- Attack on utilities
- Attack on transport
- Suicide bombers
- Hijack
- Other (*please specify*)

2.14 In your opinion, how effective have existing plans and exercises been in preparing you for those emergencies?

	Very	Reasonably	Slightly	Not at all
Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Exercises	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please make any additional comments on your experience of responding to emergencies and the lessons you have drawn from them:

Section 3: Information flows

This section is concerned with the different sources of information that you have access to which help you in developing your plans and the different weightings that you give to various information sources. It is also interested in how your plans are communicated to others.

3.1 How often do you meet with other category 1 responders – and at what level

	1-3 months	4-6 months	7-9 months	10-12 months	Less often	Never
Tactical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strategic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Operational	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3.2 How often do you meet with other category 2 responders – and at what level

	1-3 months	4-6 months	7-9 months	10-12 months	Less often	Never
Tactical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strategic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Operational	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3.3 What other organisations do you meet with?

- Voluntary
- Local businesses

3.4 What information was used to update your plans? *(please tick all which apply)*

- Internal concerns/interests
- Information/plans from other first responders
- Information from Government departments
- Information from other partner organisations

Other (please specify) _____

3.5 How useful do you consider information from each of the following:

	Useful	Of some use	None
Civil Contingencies Secretariat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Home Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cabinet Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Health protection Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partner organisations in locality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General search (i.e. Internet)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Professional risk assessment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European / international bodies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Second responder organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General public	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify) _____			

3.6 Thinking of the information you receive from the following, do you think the volume of information is

	Too much	A lot	Manageable	Sufficient	Insufficient
Civil Contingencies Secretariat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Home Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cabinet Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ODPM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Health protection Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partner organisations in locality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General search (i.e. Internet)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Professional risk assessment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European / international bodies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Second responder organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
General public	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3.7 In your opinion, should the information you receive be more streamlined?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

Section 4: Resources for emergency planning

This section asks about the resources that are invested in emergency planning. We are also interested to know your professional opinion on whether resources are being invested in the right areas and whether there are sufficient resources to make emergency planning and responses adequate for the risks identified.

4.1 How much is your organisation spending on emergency planning in the financial year 2003-2004?

- < £100,000
- £100,000 - £125,000
- £125,000 - £150,000
- £150,000 - £175,000
- £175,000 - £200,000
- >£200,000

4.2 Does your organisation have any financial contingency for responding to an emergency – if yes, how much?

- Yes £ _____
- No

4.3 How much is spent on decontamination facilities and/or protective clothing?

As this questionnaire is being sent to all Category 1 responders, we recognise that not all of the following questions will be relevant to your organisation. Please answer where appropriate.

	Yes	No	Not relevant
4.4 Do hospitals in your locality possess a mobile decontamination facility?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.5 Do health responders in your locality have access to personal protective suits?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.6 Are all police officers in the area trained to respond to terrorist incidents?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.7 Are all fire officers in the area trained to respond to terrorist incidents (i.e. chemical attack)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- 4.8 Does your authority / organisation possess all equipment necessary to respond to a terrorist incident?
- 4.9 Have you been trained to use relevant equipment?
- 4.10 Do you rely on neighbouring authorities for access to certain equipment?

If yes, what type of equipment? _____

Section 5: General perceptions

This section asks questions about your own personal perception of how emergency planning is developing and any concerns you may have about it. We are particularly keen to hear your own views rather than just the official position of your organisation. Of course, your answers will be dealt with in the strictest confidence.

5.1 In your opinion, where are the most significant gaps in planning for responding to a terrorist incident? *(please tick all that apply)*

- Communication with other agencies
- Communication with central government bodies
- Provision of information
- Training
- Funding
- Public advice

Additional comments:

5.2 In your opinion, have threat perceptions within the field of emergency planning (regarding response to terrorist incidents) changed since 9/11?

- Yes
- To some extent
- No

If you answered 'yes' or 'to some extent' please comment on any points relating to the role of local authorities and / or the emergency services:

5.3 In your opinion, which terrorist threats do you believe your locality /organisation will need to plan for?

- Bombs
- Biological incident
- Chemical incident
- Attack on utilities
- Attack on transport
- Suicide bombers
- Hijack
- Other *(please specify)*

We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for completing our questionnaire.

Please return the completed questionnaire by **Friday 19th December** to:

Ms Alison Dale
c/o Ms Caroline Laird
Department of Public Policy
De Montfort University
The Gateway
Leicester LE1 9BH